How our belief in qualia evolved, and why we care so much : a reply to David H. Baßler

David Baßler’s commentary identifies five unasked questions in my work, and provides excellent answers to them. His explanation of the gradual evolution of higher-order intentionality via a Bayesian account leads to an explanation of the persistence of our deluded belief in qualia

Why and how does consciousness seem the way it seems?

A re-expression of some of the troublesome features of my oft-caricatured theory of consciousness, with new emphases, brings out the strengths of the view and shows how it comports with and anticipates the recent introduction of Bayesian approaches to cognitive science

What is the Bandwidth of Perceptual Experience?

Although our subjective impression is of a richly detailed visual world, numerous empirical results suggest that the amount of visual information observers can perceive and remember at any given moment is limited. How can our subjective impressions be reconciled with these objective observations? Here, we answer this question by arguing that, although we see more than the handful of objects, claimed by prominent models of visual attention and working memory, we still see far less than we think we do. Taken together, we argue that these considerations resolve the apparent conflict between our subjective impressions and empirical data on visual capacity, while also illuminating the nature of the representations underlying perceptual experience. Numerous empirical results highlight the limits of visual perception, attention, and working memory. However, it intuitively feels as though we have a rich perceptual experience, leading many to claim that conscious perception overflows these limited cognitive mechanisms.A relatively new field of study (visual ensembles and summary statistics) provides empirical support for the notion that perception is not limited and that observers have access to information across the entire visual world.Ensemble statistics, and scene processing in general, also appear to be supported by neural structures that are distinct from those supporting object perception. These distinct mechanisms can work partially in parallel, providing observers with a broad perceptual experience.Moreover, new demonstrations show that perception is not as rich as is intuitively believed. Thus, ensemble statistics appear to capture the entirety of perceptual experience.National Institutes of Health (U.S.). Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award (F32EY024483)National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (Grant EY13455

El Yo como centro de gravedad narrativa

El Yo como centro de gravedad narrativ

Response to De Caro, Lavazza, Lemos, and Pereboom

Author's reply to De Caro's, Lavazza's, Lemos', and Pereboom's comments on D.C. Dennett, Reflection on Sam Harris' "Free Will

Mémek: mítoszok, félreértések és félelmek

A mémek fogalmát Richard Dawkins használta először, Az önző gén című könyvében, 1976-ban. A kezdetben sok ellenérzéssel fogadott “mém” Dennett energikus propagandakampányának köszönhetően támogatókra talált, s számos- jóllehet gyakran változó minőségű - könyv és cikk íródott róla. Dennett szerint a kulturális entitások a kiválasztódás-rendszer alapján fejlődnek, ha a Cui bono (Ki jár jól)? kérdésre a “kulturális tárgy” a válasz. Csak ebből a szemszögből érthetjük meg, hogy nemcsak a kultúra őrzői és közvetítői, hanem kulturális entitások is vagyunk

Will AI Achieve Consciousness? Wrong Question

We should not be creating conscious, humanoid agents but an entirely new sort of entity, rather like oracles, with no conscience, no fear of death, no distracting loves and hates

Reflections on Sam Harris' "Free Will"

Abstract: In his book Free Will Sam Harris tries to persuade us to abandon the morally pernicious idea of free will. The following contribution articulates and defends a more sophisticated model of free will that is not only consistent with neuroscience and introspection but also grounds a variety of responsibility that justifies both praise and blame, reward and punishment. This begins with the long lasting parting of opinion between compatibilists (who argue that free will can live comfortably with determinism) and incompatibilists (who deny this). While Harris dismisses compatibilism as a form of theology, this article aims at showing that Harris has underestimated and misinterpreted compatibilism and at defending a more sophisticated version of compatibilism that is imprevious to Harris’ criticism.Keywords: Sam Harris; Free Will; Compatibilism; Incompatibilism; Neuroscience Riflessioni su "Free Will" di Sam HarrisRiassunto: Nel suo libro Free Will Sam Harris cerca di persuaderci ad abbandonare l’idea, a suo avviso moralmente perniciosa, del libero arbitrio. Il contributo seguente articola e difende un modello di libero arbitrio che non solo è coerente con le neuroscienze e con l’introspezione, ma che dà anche fondamento a varie responsabilità giustificando encomi e biasimo, premi e punizioni. Questo prende le mosse dalla discussione della disputa di lunga data fra compatibilisti (secondo i quali il libero arbitrio può convivere pacificamente con il determinismo) e incompatibilisti (che negano questa posizione). Mentre Harris respinge il compatibilismo alla stregua di una forma di teologia, questo articolo ambisce a mostrare come Harris abbia sottostimato e mal interpretato il compatibilismo e come invece sia possibile enucleare una forma di compatibilismo più sofisticata, insensibile alle sue critiche.Parole chiave: Sam Harris; Libero arbitrio; Compatibilismo; Incompatibilismo; Neuroscienz

The Disunity of Consciousness

It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue that the orthodox view is quite wrong: phenomenal experience is not a unity, in the sense of being a single thing at each instant. It is a multiplicity, an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. Consequently, cognitive science is in need of a multi-track theory of consciousness; a computational model that acknowledges both the manifold nature of experience, and its distributed neural basis